Introduction
Current historiography on Australia's role in the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) while the latter tends to focus on the personages of William Macmahon Ball and Herbert Vere Evatt. A further feature of the latter is that these tend to be embedded within other stories, rather than pursued as an independent area of academic inquiry. The representation of Evatt and his foreign policy of the late 1940s generally, and his Japan policies in particular, appear also by inference to be crudely teleological in two ways. First, that fact that Evatt suffered from mental illness later in life seems superimposed, whether consciously or not, on his actions in the 1940s. This is apparent in the 'language of madness' used to describe Evatt's approach to foreign policy, as represented by such descriptions as 'inconsistent' 6 and 'ad hoc', 7 and by focusing on personality rather than practice. Second, his leadership role in the Australian Labor Party split in the 1950s may further colour interpretations in an ideological manner. The result is an overly emotional assessment of Evatt's role in Australian foreign policy and in the Macmahon Ball resignation, and may even be labelled as 'present-ism' rather than history. As P.G. Edwards has suggested, 'we need still to ask whether Evatt had clear goals in his handling of Anglo-Australian and Australian-American relations, or whether he merely made ad hoc reactions.' 8 It is well time to heed the advice of Edwards, proffered in 1984 , that in order to accomplish this, 'Historians must make a serious effort to get beyond the anecdotal to the analytical'. 9 This article intends to examine and challenge the main interpretations of Macmahon Ball's resignation and its relationship to the Chifley government's Japan policy over the broader canvas of the years 1945 to 1949. The argument presented is that there was no fundamental change in Australia's policy towards Japan in the post-Macmahon Ball period, and consequently the 'division' argument in relation to Macmahon Ball's resignation is a fallacious one. However, this argument is presented not as an end unto itself, but as a call to other scholars: it is surely time to reexamine Labor foreign policy under Evatt by avoiding regurgitation of established viewpoints, and returning to the archives.
The Events in Brief
Macmahon Ball, during his time as the representative of the British Commonwealth on the ACJ, followed a line that, as Dower acknowledges accurately but benignly, did not involve automatic endorsement of United States policy in Japan. 10 Evatt arrived in Japan at Kure, near Hiroshima, the base of the BCOF, on 24 
Interpretations and Points of Contention
How is the Macmahon Ball resignation interpreted in the historiography thus far? A superficial reading of the above events lends credence to the most common view, the 'Lion to Lamb' theory. 12 This theory states that Evatt, and hence Australian policy towards Japan, was converted to a distinct new course due to Evatt's visit as he was seduced or entranced by MacArthur. The General was, no doubt, a man of great presence and ego, and one could probably not help but be moved or changed personally by the experience. However, to assert that it changed the course of Australian foreign policy towards Japan is entirely another matter.
The 'Lion to Lamb' view most likely has its roots in Macmahon Ball's own personally challenging experience. In various correspondences, Macmahon Ball described Evatt as having warmly applauded him on his arrival in Kure, but after the MacArthur talks, instead appeared 'revolutionised'. Other aims are usually headed under the vague term of 'democratisation'. Essentially, these aims involved an official policy of encouraging social, political and economic reform in Japan that would increase the living standards, political awareness and participation in civil society of the bulk of the Japanese population. A specific aspect of this platform included the encouragement of the Japanese labour movement and trade unionism. 26 The outline of these policies was in place at least by mid-1945. 27 These latter policies did not focus on the short-term aims of punishment or retribution, but on the long-term rebuilding of Japan in the mould of what might be termed the 'Australian System'. 28 The 'System' included the ideals of arbitration, social security and wage fixing, and a fundamental component was a 'broad-based labour movement committed to society as an organic whole'. 29 These were core ideals to be 'exported' to Japan as part of the government's 'democratisation' policies, especially those related to industrial relations.
While these aims are imbued with paternalism and a desire to impose the victor's ideology upon the vanquished, they differ from the usual portrayal of 'harsh peace' aims. The pursuit of socio-politico-economic structural reform in Japan in Australian policy differentiated between those who had led Japan to war, and the bulk of the Japanese people who were classed as another of the war's victims. There was thus a belief that these reforms would be of benefit to the creation of 'peaceful, democratic' Japan in a positive way -rebuilding, not solely retribution. Australia could also pragmatically benefit by a democratised Japan in relation to increased security and economic advantages. The essential point is that Australian policy towards Japan was a more complex mosaic than heretofore appreciated, and a term such as 'hard-line policy' is an inadequate and, at times, misleading label.
b) Anti-Americanism/Independent Approach
There is little doubt that the Australian government under Chifley did take a more independent approach in foreign policy in this period. To a certain extent, it can also be construed as being on a collision course with the United States. For instance, the government stalled on an Australian-US treaty of friendship, they resisted pressure from the United States to change the double taxation system, and there was the Manus Island dispute over reciprocal access for Australians to United States bases in the Pacific. The Labor government was certainly suspicious of United States intentions and ambitions, but did that equate with anti-Americanism? Evatt and Chifley were realists and could see that Australia could not solve its own problems, let alone those of the Pacific, on its own -they required the leadership and support of the United States, and Labor hoped that nurturing the old imperial ties in the new Commonwealth would act as a balance of power against US regional ambitions.
Additionally, Evatt placed great faith in the United Nations to be an arena where the voices of smaller and medium powers could be heard. 30 As Siracusa and Barclay state, 'Evatt was anything but anti-American in either his public policy or his private statements'. 31 The 'anti-Americanism' argument is a mythical by-product of a more assertive international stance by Australia. The challenge for Evatt and Chifley, then, was to juggle both a more independent role within the Commonwealth without alienating Britain and the United States. This challenge was complicated by the increase in international tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States in the postwar period. At this point, it can be asserted that generally, the labels used to describe Australian foreign policy prior to Evatt's Tokyo visit and the Macmahon Ball resignation are inadequate and even misrepresentative.
Australian policy towards Japan following Macmahon Ball's resignation
The second concept that needs to be challenged in the volte-face argument is that Australian policy did change. A distinction also needs to be drawn between real policy changes and changes in the methods to achieve a certain policy. This distinction was first articulated by Rosecrance, but appears to have been forgotten or ignored since. 32 Too often in the literature, it appears that a change in policy is presented as a priori without requiring any further evidence or elaboration: Australian policy changed, therefore Macmahon Ball was forsaken. Evatt's 'Report on Mission to Japan' can be used as one piece of evidence to investigate whether such a change occurred. 33 In this report, Evatt is generous in his assessment of MacArthur's leadership in Japan. In relation to short-term 'harsh peace' aims, such as demilitarisation, Evatt does claim success under MacArthur and BCOF. However, the policy of long-term supervision of Japan is never officially dropped.
Evatt demonstrates more scepticism where 'democratisation' aims are concerned. When the Japanese government, with the blessing of SCAP, sought to prohibit Japanese public servants from striking in 1948, Shaw defended their right to strike on the ACJ. He stressed the need to distinguish between government employees proper, and employees in the type of government enterprise that could also be found in private enterprise. The solution he presented was one of a 'compulsory independent third party arbitrator', and offered Australia's help in implementing such a system in Japan. 38 Shaw questioned to wisdom of 'curtailing any human rights by long term legislation'. 39 This speech by Shaw had the effect of infuriating MacArthur. 40 Likewise, the Australian delegation to the FEC acted to defend the rights of Japanese workers -and Australian interests. They submitted their own labour proposal to the However, rather than resort to the veto, which could have been a source of embarrassment to the United States, they turned to more covert means to defeat the proposal. The United States targeted the governments that supported the proposal, officials in Canberra, and the Australian FEC delegation itself to convince all that such a proposal would only serve the interests of communism in Japan, and would have disastrous effects on the prestige of MacArthur himself. 43 Under this diplomatic onslaught, the Australians withdrew their proposal.
As with issues pertaining to labour in Japan, Australia's commitment to constitutional reform did not change. This task was primarily carried out on the FEC and with Evatt's direct input. Evatt was a consistent defender of the right of the Japanese people to review the postwar constitution -the 'provision for review' -after a certain period of operation. 44 The final FEC decision on this decided that 'not sooner than one year and not later than two years after it goes into effect' should this review take place. 45 In 1947, MacArthur and the Japanese government reluctantly and quietly accepted it. 46 When the agreed time frame was coming towards its end in 1948, the Australian member of the FEC requested that the revision process now be pursued.
Once again MacArthur refused, and a fierce exchange of words took place between the FEC and Tokyo. MacArthur won this time -and any review process that took place was merely an arbitrary exercise. 47 While both the pursuit of constitutional revision and the Australian labour proposal were ultimately unsuccessful, they cannot be seen as conforming to United States policy, nor can they be seen as straying from the original aims of the policies of the Chifley government prior to Macmahon Ball's departure. The above examples surely belie Rix's claim that Evatt 'aligned himself with the United States on the major issues, while still prepared to maintain a hard line on questions -such as whalingwhich did not affect the fundamental direction of MacArthur's' policy'. 48 Labour reform and constitutional revision were definitely fundamental to both US and Australian policy towards Japan, but each party held very different views on how these should be implemented. On these matters Australia was willing to stand up to the United States and MacArthur -for as long as it practically could under enormous pressure.
So far, it seems there were not obvious changes to the main elements of Australian policy towards Japan after the Macmahon Ball resignation. However, there is also the fundamental question of method -how were these aims expected to be achieved?
Prior to Evatt's visit to Tokyo, there had developed in government circles dissatisfaction with Australia's ability to influence the progress of the Occupation on the control bodies of the ACJ and FEC. This was viewed primarily in terms of US domination of the Occupation, characterised as the 'MacArthur curtain', 49 and USSoviet rivalry. The way around this situation, as envisaged by Evatt, was an early peace treaty with long-term allied supervision. MacArthur, for his own reasons, also wanted an early peace treaty for Japan. This did not change for either after Evatt's visit -at least not until 1948/49 when US-Soviet tensions were reaching towards fever pitch and only the most intransigent were calling for an early peace treaty with Japan. That change, however, was due to an assessment of the international situation, not the Evatt-MacArthur talks.
To achieve an early peace treaty, Evatt knew he needed support from elsewhereand it was MacArthur's that he sought. It was the desire for an early peace treaty that The talks were also 'successful' because the discussion focused on an agenda that MacArthur and Evatt had already found agreement on, while downplaying or ignoring more contentious issues. Evatt and MacArthur found a position of agreement on security issues: those points of contention related to labour, social, political and economic reform were conveniently ignored. The Australian government could afford to wait for the expected peace conference to openly air these views.
Therefore, there was a method to Evatt's visit to SCAP -the Australian government's basic Japan policy was not transformed, did not become totally proAmerican, and was not the result of ad hoc decisions or of Evatt being charmed. The only change in this period was the method to achieve Australian aims -an early peace treaty with long-term supervision of Japan. MacArthur's support was sought, and gained, to add weight to this strategy. Rix's words that Evatt lost a 'chance to become involved in a constructive Japan policy' by the repudiation of Macmahon Ball is a fallacy. Buckley et al are much closer in their analysis: 'Evatt's policy at this juncture was precisely that -to become involved in a Japan policy before the Americans proceeded with the reconstruction of Japan on their own terms'. 52 
Australian foreign policy as synonymous with H.V. Evatt
The third area of contention is the erroneous presumption that Evatt was Australian foreign policy. Evatt looms as such an imposing figure at this juncture of Australian foreign policy history, and certainly liked to portray himself as such, that it is easy to ignore that there was an official government policy, of course influenced extensively, but not totally, by Evatt. Chifley, for instance, though strongly focused on domestic issues, was a prime minister literate in issues pertaining to international relations. I don't quite understand what you meant when you said that the Minister regarded the foreign policy of Australia as his personal possession. Did you mean that he was not open to conviction or that he penalised those who differed from him? It is really a question of experience and some skill is needed in all of these cases to get one's views before a Minister. A great deal of practice is particularly required by the Minister, but this is quite common with men who are extremely busy. They tend to be preoccupied by the most important things or by their previous policy and tend to resist influences which change it. I may be in a different position but I have never found that the Minister resisted views contrary to his own, and have never hesitated to put them before him, but I would exercise a good deal of care about the way in which I do so. 56 Granted, Eggleston did have a special place in the eyes of Evatt in External Affairs.
Eggleston was considered to be a 'sage' where international affairs were concerned, Forsyth questions why 'equally able and well-informed men' such as K.H. Bailey and Eggleston, Evatt's key advisors, who were able to work well with Evatt, have been overlooked. 60 Of relevance is Watt's assertion that:
Foreign Ministers, of course, do not work in a vacuum; their effectiveness at a conference depends substantially upon the abilities and activities of their staffs and upon the adequacy of the preparatory work done before a conference opens. In these respects Evatt was well served. The real problem in relation to Japan was not the ad hoc policy of its Minister, but internal contradictions within Australian policy itself, for example pursuing an independent stance while attempting to court both the United States and Britain, combined with unfavourable international circumstances -the emerging cold war.
Macmahon Ball as Scapegoat
Of what, then, was Macmahon Ball a victim, if indeed we see him as a victim at all?
Buckley et al make a simple, emphatic statement that cuts to the essence of the debate: 'Macmahon Ball was dispensable -MacArthur was not'. 63 While it is understandable to take the view that using Macmahon Ball as a scapegoat or bargaining chip in pursuit of foreign policy objectives is ethically reprehensible, it does not preclude us from trying to gain an understanding of motivations and results of the Evatt-MacArthur talks. A reflection by Forsyth is pertinent to understanding Evatt's behaviour in this regard. Evatt, he states, 'believed in his ideals and principles, even if in fighting for them he often used underhand, discreditable and sometimes shocking means'. 64 Evatt's tactics were often Machiavellian, but they were not necessarily ad hoc.
Evatt was aware very early that Macmahon Ball was the thorn in MacArthur's side. Burton urged Macmahon Ball to stay on, but cautioned: 'if the type of work does not suit you -and it is the same type whether it is Tokyo or elsewhere -that is a matter for you to decide'. 67 Watt wrote of Macmahon Ball, and others who had been appointed to temporary high diplomatic posts overseas from outside the Department, that they often expected 'consideration and privileges far beyond those accorded to his colleagues, who have been processed rather roughly over the years through the government machine'. Rix goes further to claim Evatt neglected both Macmahon Ball and the ACJ, choosing to focus instead on the UN and the FEC. 72 He seems to suggest that Evatt could have single-handedly acted as the saviour of the ACJ if only he had tried harder and been more loyal to Ball. 73 This idea is rather preposterous considering the major players, the United States and USSR, were using the ACJ as a forum for ideological struggle, Britain was offering neither support nor guidance to its ostensible representative, and Nationalist China was caught up in civil war and dependent on United States support, therefore loath to act critically. It also ignores some essential facts that Evatt and Chifley would have had to weigh in the face of the obvious impotence of the ACJ.
These can be summarised as follows: the FEC was, ostensibly, the policy making body of the Occupation, while the ACJ was merely advisory; on the ACJ an 
